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1. Introduction 
1.1 Water is one of Scotland’s most vital and 
largest industries. It is an input into all other forms 
of economic activity as well as being part of every 
family’s expenditure. It is therefore important, both 
for living standards and for the economy, that the 
pricing of water in Scotland is taken extremely 
seriously and that efforts are made to have an 
appropriate, sustainable charging system. Since 
2002, when the office of the Water Industry 
Commissioner for Scotland was established
1
, we 
have analysed the various methods used to 
determine water charges, and have shown that 
each of the various methods have major faults. See 
for example our previous articles in the Fraser of 
Allander Commentary, (Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 
2007, 2009).  
 
1.2 In 2008, the Cabinet Secretary for Finance 
raised with us the problem of capital charges on the 
water industry: it was expected that changes in 
Treasury policy would make water capital charges 
an increasing real burden to the Scottish 
government budget. As a result of both this concern 
and our 2007 Commentary paper, (which had set 
out the problems with the current method of setting 
water charges), we proposed a new charging 
system for Scottish Water, details of which we 
published in the Fraser of Allander Commentary in 
February 2009. Under our proposed charging 
system, net new capital formation financed from 
customer charges would be regarded as being paid 
                                                          
1
 The Commissioner was replaced by the Water Industry 
Commission for Scotland in 2006, which body regulates 
Scottish Water and determines the caps to be placed on 
water revenues: in effect determining water charges. 
for by a notional loan from the customer base as a 
whole to Scottish Water. We suggested that the 
body of customers as a whole would then earn a 
return: this would be in the form of a rebate, equal 
to historic cost interest and depreciation on the 
notional loan. In our paper, we showed how this 
approach would be fully sustainable, and would 
lead to significantly lower charges for customers 
than the present regulatory capital value pricing 
system. The approach would also have had 
significant benefits as regards the capital charge 
which, (when the paper was written), the Treasury 
levied from departments on the capital assets of 
public corporations.  
 
1.3 Although we received no response from 
the Water Industry Commission for Scotland, 
(WICS), or the Scottish government civil service 
with responsibility for water to this or our earlier 
paper, it transpires that the civil service did provide 
a briefing on our paper to Ministers. In the summer 
of 2010 we were given a copy of the brief which had 
been put to Ministers by the civil service, 
commenting on our proposal. This brief was 
originally prepared for Ministers in 2009, and a 
slightly revised version was put to Ministers again in 
mid 2010. It is the later version of the brief which 
has now been given to us. A copy is attached as an 
annex to this paper.  
 
1.4 This paper represents our critique of the 
civil service comments on our proposal. We will 
demonstrate that the advice put to Ministers was 
seriously flawed: in several respects the advice was 
factually wrong – and we believe that there were 
major omissions relating to matters which should 
have been covered in advice given to Ministers. Our 
conclusion is that Ministers would have found it 
impossible to make a properly informed decision 
about the relative properties of different charging 
methods, or about the merits of our specific 
proposal, on the basis of the civil service brief. 
 
1.5 Section 2 is the main part of this paper, 
where we examine what the civil service said about 
our proposals, and explain why their analysis is 
flawed. In section 3, we take the opportunity to 
consider the implications for our proposed charging 
system of the change that the Treasury has 
subsequently announced in the operation of capital 
charges.  
 
2. Our critique of the civil service 
brief which commented on our original 
proposals 
2.1 The civil service brief commenting on our 
proposals set out in our Fraser of Allander paper of 
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February 2009 is reproduced in the annex to this 
paper.  
 
2.2 Before considering the civil service 
argument in detail, it is necessary to give some 
background on the RCV method of setting utility 
prices, (as used by the WICS and by OFWAT in 
England and Wales.)  
 
According to the definition given by the WICS, the 
RCV of a utility like Scottish Water is “The capital 
base used in setting charge limits. The value of the 
regulated assets on which Scottish Water can earn 
a return.” (WICS, 2005, p38) 
Starting from some initially estimated value, the 
RCV is then rolled forward by a process of annual 
updating. This process involves: 
 
a) uprating the previous year’s RCV figure for 
inflation;  
b) adding in the nominal value of investment 
undertaken during the year; 
  
c) subtracting off depreciation, assessed in 
current cost terms. 
 
How this RCV fits in to the determination of charges 
is as follows. The basis for setting charge limits in 
any given year is: 
 
i) an appropriate allowance for the operating 
costs of the undertaking; 
 
ii) plus an allowance for the cost of capital, 
worked out as an appropriate interest rate applied 
to the RCV; 
 
iii) plus an allowance for current cost 
depreciation and infrastructure renewal expenditure. 
 
Details of the application of this process can be 
found in (WICs, 2005, p294, and WICS 2009, sheet 
P4). (Note that, when the WICS first introduced the 
RCV approach in the 2006 Strategic Review of 
charges, their initial estimate of RCV was for the 
year 2009/10, and this was then rolled back to 
2006/07 by reversing the above procedure: this 
does not affect our comments below, on the general 
properties of the RCV approach.)  
 
2.3 For present purposes, the important thing 
about the version of the RCV method as used in the 
water industries in Scotland, and England and 
Wales, is that it is applied in current cost terms: 
specifically, when the RCV is uprated each year, 
the previous year’s RCV is uprated for inflation: and 
when depreciation enters the process, what is used 
is an estimate of current cost depreciation. (There 
are versions of the RCV approach applied 
elsewhere in the world where the process is done in 
historic cost terms.)  It was this current cost aspect 
of the RCV approach as applied in the UK which 
was the basis of our Commentary paper of 2007.   
 
2.4 We refer the reader to that article for the 
full details of our critique of the current cost version 
of the RCV method. In that paper, we developed the 
financial model of an idealised utility, which 
undertakes a constant amount of real investment 
each year, and which finances this investment by 
borrowing. We assumed that the utility was funded 
as if it were charging customers RCV prices: that is, 
as if it were charging customers an interest charge 
based upon current cost RCV, and also charging 
customers to cover current cost depreciation. We 
then compared the company’s income from these 
sources with the loan charges it would have to pay 
on its borrowing. We also assumed that the 
company started off with an initial RCV of zero.  
 
What the model showed was that, if inflation was 
positive, then the company’s RCV rapidly came to 
exceed the company’s outstanding financial debts: 
in effect, a substantial part of the RCV was being 
generated through inflation, rather than as a direct 
result of the capital the company had borrowed and 
invested. The effects were substantial: for example, 
if inflation was at 2.5%, and assuming the company 
was investing in assets with a 30 year life, then in 
the long run, 20% of the RCV would be generated 
by inflation, rather than directly relating to 
investment. If inflation was at 5%, then 34% of the 
RCV in the long run would be generated by the 
effects of inflation. 
In terms of customer charges, what the company 
received by way of charges from customers rapidly 
came to exceed what it had to pay out by way of 
loan charges. In other words, the company was 
making a substantial profit over and above what 
was needed to fully fund its capital investment.  
 
The detailed modelling in our 2007 paper related to 
the version of regulatory capital value pricing 
originally implemented in Scotland, under which the 
interest charge is calculated by applying a nominal 
rate of interest to the RCV. As noted in that paper, 
OFWAT applies a different version of regulatory 
capital value pricing, under which a real interest rate 
is applied to RC V. Note, however, that if real 
interest rates are positive, the OFWAT variant still 
implies that the charge to customers significantly 
exceeds the funding cost of the capital invested. 
 
It is important to note that these effects stem from 
the way that current cost RCV pricing uprates the 
RCV each year: and that the long term effects are 
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independent of how the initial RCV estimate is 
calculated.  
 
2.5 Let us now consider the argument in the 
civil service brief. The brief claims that there are two 
key errors in our analysis of the regulatory model 
being applied by the WICS. The first of these 
claimed errors is outlined in paragraphs 4 to 6 of the 
brief.  
 
Paragraph 4 first of all states that “…the Cuthberts 
assume that the regulatory capital values (RCV) 
used in the water industry (both in England & Wales 
and in Scotland) are an estimate of the value of the 
assets employed, derived from how much it would 
cost to create those assets. This is incorrect.”  
 
This claim is, however, in itself incorrect. In our 
2007 paper we made it clear, (paragraph 2.2), that 
in practice a number of different approaches were 
possible towards the basis of calculation of RCV. 
The important point, however, is that in the 
modelling developed in that paper, we considered 
the steady state, (that is, long run), position of a 
notional utility, with an initial RCV which started at 
zero, and which was then rolled on from year to 
year using exactly the same approach as employed 
by WICS/OFWAT. The long run RCV in our model 
is on exactly the same basis as implied by the 
WICS/OFWAT approach.  
 
The civil service’s first claim that we have made an 
error is, therefore, wrong.  
2.6   As seen in the previous paragraph, there is 
no difference in the basis of the RCV with which we 
are working. The question then boils down to the 
issue of how that RCV should be remunerated: that 
is, what return needs to be earned on that RCV to 
adequately compensate investors.  
 
The only reasonable interpretation of what the civil 
service are saying in their paragraph 5 is that the 
RCV has to be remunerated in line with the charges 
implied by the current cost RCV pricing method, or 
else investors would not fund any further 
investment. However, no evidence is given in the 
brief to justify this implicit assertion that what is 
required is remuneration in line with current cost 
RCV. In other words, once we have removed the 
incorrect civil service claim in paragraph 4 of the 
brief that we are dealing with the wrong definition of 
RCV, the civil service’s first attempt at rebutting our 
criticism of the current cost RCV pricing method 
amounts to no more than an unsubstantiated claim 
that we are wrong.  
 
2.7 We now consider the second error which 
the brief claims we have made. This is described as 
follows: “The second error the Cuthbert‟s analysis 
appears to make is that the RCV, together with the 
cost of capital, are the sole determinants of 
customer charges. In practice, WICS (like OFWAT) 
has used the RCV as a guide but has set charges 
on a cash basis.” 
 
Our 2007 critique of the current cost RCV approach 
is based on the published descriptions of how 
OFWAT and the WICS use RCV in setting prices. 
As regards OFWAT, our paper not merely describes 
the way they say they use RCV in setting prices: it 
also then draws inferences about the likely results 
of this approach, which are entirely consistent with 
the outcomes observed in practice – such as the 
extremely high returns earned on the equity capital 
actually invested: the high prices paid for water and 
sewage companies in England in post-privatisation 
trading (often described by commentators as 
“irrational”): and distortion of the English companies 
capital programmes. Given all this, it is 
disingenuous to say that, in effect, OFWAT do not 
really rely on RCV, but are primarily setting prices 
on some other basis.  
 
Exactly the same comment applies when we 
consider the potential impact of RCV pricing on 
Scottish Water prices. The statement in the critique 
that “The cash basis is driven by financial ratios, 
such as gearing and free cash flow, that investors 
see as critical indicators of a company‟s financial 
health”, does not reflect what the published Final 
Determination for 2010 actually says and does. We 
quote from Final Determination papers:  
 
“Staff Paper 3 
The Commission signalled in the last review that it 
would move towards the method of charge setting 
that is widely used by other utility regulators in the 
UK. This method sets an assumed annual rate of 
return on a „regulatory capital value‟ (RCV).  
 
Staff Paper 9 
The level of revenue is calculated using the RCV 
approach.” 
 
In addition, the detail of the financial model, 
published with the final determination, shows the 
calculation of rolling the RCV forward, and 
calculating a capital charge by applying an interest 
rate to this RCV. 
 
It is perfectly true that the process of setting prices 
in the final determination cross checks the results 
against key financial ratios: we have never sought 
to deny this. But to imply, as the brief does, that the 
RCV approach is almost irrelevant, and that prices 
are actually being driven by some quite different 
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approach, simply runs counter to the published final 
determination of charges. 
 
2.8 The civil service brief is therefore wrong in 
its claim that we made two “key errors”. But the brief 
is not just wrong in what it says, but also in what it 
omits to say. As we will now argue, the advice given 
to Ministers should have included discussion of 
certain important topics which are just not featured 
in the brief at all.  
 
2.9 Consider, for example, paragraph 5 of the 
brief. We have already noted above (para 2.6), that 
paragraph 5 of the brief amounts to making a 
particular assertion about the answer to the 
following question: namely, what return needs to be 
generated on the RCV in order that the funding cost 
of the capital invested in the company can be fully 
reimbursed? Now the RCV of the company, and the 
funding cost of the investment capital, are related to 
one another in a straightforward, but nevertheless 
fairly complex manner, depending on parameters 
like the inflation rate, interest rate, and asset life. 
Sensible statements about the relationship can 
therefore only be made in terms of some form of 
mathematical model, which takes these parameters 
into account. This is precisely the approach we 
adopted in our 2007 paper, where we developed 
one specific model of the evolution of RCV for an 
idealised utility. We are not claiming infallibility for 
our approach: but the important point is that 
criticism of our approach has to be along the lines 
either of pointing out a specific error in the 
calculations within our model, or in the assumptions 
underlying that model. The civil service brief, 
however, does not attempt to do this – but instead, 
relies on a loose and unsubstantiated assertion.  
 
In our view, it is a major weakness of the brief that, 
in advising Ministers on a subject where an 
appreciation of modelling issues is paramount, the 
brief makes no attempt to use the tools which are 
essential for discussing and appreciating the 
relevant issues.  
 
2.10 There is another grave omission in relation 
to what the brief claims is the second error in our 
approach. We have already discussed the civil 
service claim that water prices in Scotland are set, 
not using the RCV method, but actually on the basis 
of certain financial ratios, which “investors see as 
critical indicators of a company’s financial health.” 
Surely, however, if it was indeed true that water 
prices were set like this, then the brief should go 
into detail about what method is actually used – and 
what the implications are. How are the key ratios 
actually applied: why is it appropriate for pricing for 
a publicly owned utility like Scottish Water, which 
can borrow at significantly lower costs than market 
rates, to be driven by financial ratios which would 
satisfy private investors: what are the implications of 
the approach which the WICS actually uses for the 
future trajectory of customer charges: and crucially, 
how does this trajectory compare with the trajectory 
which would result from the application of our 
proposed charging scheme. 
 
Ministers are in no position to make a rational 
decision about the comparative methods of different 
charging schemes unless they are provided with the 
sort of detail implicit in these questions – and yet 
this detail is completely lacking in the civil service 
advice to Ministers.  
 
2.11 We have dealt so far with the two main 
criticisms which the brief attempts to make of our 
approach. Before concluding, however, it is worth 
remarking on certain other aspects of the brief 
which are surprising.  
 
2.12 In paragraph 11, the brief in effect second 
guesses what the likely reaction of HMT and HMRC 
would be to our customer loan proposal. It is not our 
business to second or third guess what the likely 
reaction of government departments would be. 
However, we would say that: 
 
a. If Treasury did oppose, they would have to 
justify going against World Bank advice that it is 
desirable to reward customers for customer 
financed capital. 
 
b. As regards the imputed HMRC position, 
since the notional interest and debt repayment 
are taken out of customer charges before they 
are even set, they would not feature at all in the 
accounts of SW, and hence are unlikely to be of 
any concern to HMRC. 
 
(See, however, section 3 of this paper, where we 
examine the implications of the Treasury’s recent 
decision to abolish the capital charge).  
 
2.13 The civil service brief claims in paragraph 
6 that the WICS initial estimate of the RCV of 
Scottish Water is likely “to approximate the value 
investors would pay to own Scottish Water”. The 
initial RCV estimated by the WICS for 2009-10, 
when the WICS introduced the RCV method in 
Scotland, was £5.4 billion: and the WICS rolled this 
backwards, (as noted in paragraph 2.2 above), to 
give a value of £4.1 billion in 2006-07. The strategic 
review of charges for 2010-2015, however, 
recorded the outcome of an exercise undertaken by 
Scottish Water to assess the modern equivalent 
asset value of its assets. This resulted in an 
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estimate of £42.7 billion in 2009-10 for the current 
cost net book value of Scottish water’s assets, 
(rising to almost £50 billion in 2014-15.). It seems 
extraordinary that the brief did not alert Ministers to 
the huge discrepancy between the WICS estimate 
of the sale value of Scottish Water, and the value of 
the assets over which control would be lost in the 
event of a sale.  
 
2.14 Overall, therefore, we see no merit, and 
much that is surprising, in the civil service critique of 
our findings on the RCV method and of our 
proposed replacement.   The critique is not merely 
factually wrong in key respects: what is really 
surprising are the omissions from the civil service 
brief. In particular, it attempts to deal in a purely 
verbal basis with issues that are fundamentally 
matters of modelling: and it undertakes no serious 
analysis of the model which forms the basis for our 
critique of the current cost RCV method, nor does it 
undertake modelling of its own. Moreover, despite 
its surprising and implausible claim that prices are 
actually set on the basis of certain key financial 
ratios, rather than the RCV method, it then fails to 
specify what the resulting long term trajectory of 
charges would be on the basis of applying these 
ratios. Our conclusion is that Ministers would have 
found it impossible to make a properly informed 
decision about the relative properties of different 
charging methods, or about the merits of our 
specific proposal, on the basis of the civil service 
brief. 
 
3. Postscript: the implications of 
the Treasury decision to abolish the 
capital charge 
3.1 A primary reason why we structured our 
proposal for a revised charging system for Scottish 
Water specifically in terms of a notional customer 
loan was because of the capital charge which the 
Treasury levied on departments in respect of capital 
assets – including the assets of public corporations 
like Scottish Water. (Indeed, the reason we 
addressed the issue was because of the concerns 
addressed to us personally by the Cabinet 
Secretary for Finance about the cost of the capital 
charge relating to Scottish Water). As we explain in 
our 2009 paper, our approach would have given the 
Scottish government a strong case to pursue with 
HM Treasury for exemption from a large part of the 
capital charge on Scottish Water’s assets.  
 
3.2 Since publishing our earlier paper, 
however, there has been an important development 
– in that, in 2010, the Treasury effectively 
announced the abolition of the capital charge: 
(Treasury, 2010, page 20). This change opens up 
the opportunity for an even simpler, and ultimately 
even cheaper, approach to charging for water in 
Scotland – namely, moving to a position where all 
Scottish Water’s capital expenditure is funded 
directly from customer charges. This approach 
would be entirely feasible for a body of the size of 
Scottish Water, which has a large and stable 
investment programme. We have undertaken some 
further work in modelling both the long term and 
transitional arrangements of this approach. It is not 
the place here to go into the full detail of this 
modelling work: but, to summarise, this work does 
indicate that: 
 
a) the transition to funding capital directly 
from revenue could be achieved at the price of a 
relatively small extra cost burden on customers 
in the short term. 
 
b) the long term implications of this policy 
would be a very significant cost reduction for 
customers.  
 
c) And since Scottish Water would no longer 
need to borrow at all, the annual saving to the 
Scottish government would build up to the full 
£140 million annual provision for Scottish Water 
borrowing which is currently in the Scottish 
government DEL.  
 
3.3 What we would now propose, therefore, 
given the recent change in capital charge rules, 
would be moving to a system where all of Scottish 
Water’s capital expenditure was funded direct from 
customer charges, rather than the proposal set out 
in our 2009 paper of treating customer financed 
capital as a notional loan. 
 
____________________ 
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Annex 
The following is the civil service critique which was 
put to Ministers in reaction to our proposal on water 
pricing. The passages in italics were not in the 
original brief, but were included in the version put to 
Ministers in mid 2010:- 
 
A critique of the Cuthbert’s analysis on 
the pricing mechanism currently used 
for  Scottish Water 
 
Background 
1. The Cuthberts contend that the regulatory model 
being applied by the WICS (and as it happens all 
other economic regulators across the UK) imposes 
too high charges on customers and as a corollary 
over high returns for the regulated utilities. Their (or 
conceivably another) alternative might rectify that 
undesirable position. They further content that an 
alternative regulatory model such as they one they 
advocate  would act as a greater incentive to capital 
efficiency on Scottish Water’s part to the overall 
benefit of the Scottish economy. 
 
2. As part of an alternative regulatory model the 
Cuthberts have argued that the concept of customer 
loans could reduce the need for lending to Scottish 
Water (SW) from government, thus freeing 
resources for other priorities. 
 
Critique of the Cuthbert’s analysis of the 
regulatory model applied by WICS 
 
3. There appear to be two key errors in the 
Cuthberts’ analysis of the regulatory model being 
applied by the WICS. 
 
4. Firstly the Cuthberts assume that the regulatory 
capital values (RCV) used in the water industry 
(both in England & Wales and in Scotland) are an 
estimate of the value of the assets employed, 
derived from how much it would cost to create those 
assets. This is incorrect. The regulatory capital 
value for the companies in England & Wales was 
originally set in the early 1990s and reflected the 
value paid for them on privatisation. Since then the 
RCV has been updated each year to reflect new 
(efficient) investment (over and above any 
investment to maintain the assets in the current 
state), which is funded by investors.  
 
5. The RCVs of the companies in England and 
Wales therefore reflects the funds investors have 
put into those companies, which is why it is 
appropriate that this investment is remunerated. If it 
wasn’t, investors would not fund any further 
investment.  
 
6. An absence of information on what investors 
would pay for SW results in the RCV being set by 
the WICS based on the RCV of equivalent sized 
companies in E&W. SW’s RCV is not therefore a 
reflection of the value of the assets employed, 
based on how much it would cost to create them. 
Rather it is an estimate of the regulatory value of 
SW, based on comparators from E&W, which is 
likely to approximate the value investors would pay 
to own SW. 
 
7. The second error the Cuthbert’s analysis appears 
to make is that the RCV, together with the cost of 
capital, are the sole determinants of customer 
charges. In practice, WICS (like OFWAT) has used 
the RCV as a guide but has set charges on a cash 
basis. The cash basis is driven by financial ratios, 
such as gearing and free cash flow, that investors 
see as critical indicators of a company’s financial 
health.  
 
8. These two erroneous positions lead the 
Cuthberts to conclude that “under the present 
charging model a significant financial surplus is 
likely to build up”, and that the utilisation of this 
surplus would allow customer charges to fall without 
borrowing from Government increasing.   
 
9. In fact the cash basis that WICS uses is designed 
to ensure a tight budget constraint on SW. With one 
exception, a financial surplus builds up only if SW 
outperforms the regulatory settlement.   
 
10. The exception is that in the Final Determination 
for the 2010-15 period WICS explicitly funds 
Scottish Water to be able to pay commercial 
borrowing rates – that is the borrowing rates that 
would be incurred if Scottish Water was raising 
finance independently of Government. Further 
advice is provided on this in the annex but it should 
be noted that that the financial surplus does not 
occur as a result of the RCV methodology. Rather 
the surplus arises due to an explicit decision by 
WICS to providing sufficient finance so that SW 
could borrow commercially. 
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Critique of the Cuthberts’ proposals for 
customer loans 
 
11. With regards to the idea of a customer loan, we 
do not think that this proposal offers the possibility 
of replacing Government lending to Scottish Water. 
Further investigation has revealed that: 
 
o HM Treasury is highly likely to view loans 
from customers to SW as analogous to 
private sector funding. Under its present 
structure private sector funding scores 
exactly the same as if the SG had lent SW 
the funds – i.e. as SG expenditure. 
Converting part of the existing charge on 
customers to a loan is therefore highly dis-
advantageous – it increases Government 
lending to SW without increasing the 
finance that is available to SW. 
 
o The Cuthberts’ suggestion assumes that 
Scottish Water could simply deem some of 
its income to be classed as loans. HMRC 
would require convincing that this was not 
a tax dodge as it is possible that there 
would be a tax advantage to SW. They are 
likely to seek evidence of credit 
agreements at the individual customer 
level. This would effectively require SW to 
account for loans to every household, 
which would be disproportionate to any tax 
gain that might accrue and would pose 
challenging questions of how to gain 
consumer consent for making loans and 
what to do if that consent were not 
forthcoming.    
 
12. It therefore does not appear that customer loans 
are a productive option to pursue. 
 
Summary 
13. To summarise, the Cuthbert’s errors in their 
analysis of the regulatory model being applied by 
the WICS have lead them to a false conclusion. The 
bottom line is that SW’s financing only comes from 
two sources – customer charges and borrowing 
from Government. If one declines, the other must 
increase to compensate. The Cuthberts’ proposal 
on customer loans does not appear to be a 
productive option to pursue. 
 
